PSIR Simplified

In the given context, India’s nuclear threat scenario can be viewed both within the narrow and broad perspectives:

In narrow perspective, we need to take into account the nuclear threats posed by Pakistan’s intended and unintended actions:

First, it is well known that Pakistan is far behind to India in the conventional military capabilities. After the humiliating defeat in the 1971 war, it has embarked on the nuclear weapon programme to offset India’s edge in conventional capabilities. Thus, in spite of all odds, Pakistan is likely to resorts to nuclear weapons in case of conventional war with India if such war is likely to inflict huge infrastructural damage or leading to a humiliating defeat as happened in 1971.

Second, Pakistan is reported to have developed tactical or small nuclear weapons (up to a range of 500 kms) as main inventory of her nuclear arsenals. This is due to three reasons. First, Pakistan perceives India as the main source of external security threat and tactical weapons are adequate for addressing this threat both as deterrent as well as actual use. Second, tactical weapons have low investment and are within the low technological and financial capabilities of Pakistan. Third, Pakistan perceives that tactical nuclear weapons will be confined to merely a limited nuclear war with the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the battle field. However, this perception of a limited nuclear war is misplaced as it may trigger major nuclear response from India.

Third, Pakistan is also prone to challenges of nuclear security. In view of weak capacity of state and government and larger political space occupied by Terrorists groups and Extremists in Pakistan, one cannot rule out the possibility of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of these groups either by design or by default. Terrorist groups like LeT, JeM, Hijbul Mujahideen are very influential in Pakistani government and Army. Pakistan has been using terrorists as tools of her foreign policy. It is not just a coincidence that Pakistan has been placed three times (2008, 2012, and 2018) in the Grey List of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes. 

Fourth, in view of Pakistan’s low technological and infrastructural capabilities, it is handicapped in adopting robust nuclear safety measures. Nuclear safety involves the safe operation of nuclear facilities to ward off any danger o accidental radiation as happened in Chernobyl (Russia) in 1986 and Fukushima (japan) in 2011. Pakistan at present has six nuclear power reactors, two research reactors as well as undeclared nuclear warheads. A Pugwash (2002) Report noted weak nuclear security and safety measures in Pakistan. A team of International Atomic Agency (IAEA) in 2022 noted safety challenges of Nuclear facilities of Pakistan in the fields of decommissioning, spent fuel management and radioactive waste disposal. Since Pakistan shares along border with India, any accidental radiation due to weak nuclear safety will have devastating radiological effects in India also. This is like an accidental nuclear attack by Pakistan.

In brief, there are a number of factors, inherent in the Pakistani nuclear ecosystem, which enhance the possibility of use of nuclear weapons either by design or by accident. The Pugwash Report has succinctly summed up the dangerous nature of nuclear landscape of Pakistan: The combination of radical extremism, economic impoverishment -and lack of perspectives-, national humiliation, territorial disputes, critical governmental structures and nuclear weapons is a dangerous cocktail and no western country should feel exempt from taking their shares of responsibility in this part of the world .

Within the broad perspective, India’s nuclear threats are not confined to Pakistan only. In India’s neibhourhood, China is also a major nuclear power. China conducted its first nuclear experiment in October, 1964 at Lop Nor in Xinjian province. In recent years China has developed considerable nuclear stockpile. According to CSIS assessment, China has doubled its nuclear weapons in last three years  from 200 warheads in 2022 to 600 warheads in 2025. India and China have long standing boundary dispute and there had been military confrontation between the two in 1962. China may not use nuclear force against India as it enjoys conventional edge over India, but its strategic nexus with Pakistan is a cause of worry for India. Pakistan’s missile programme has been developed with the assistance of China and also China is the main source of supply of advance weapons to Pakistan. China also assisted Pakistan in the development of nuclear weapons in 1980s. A report (National Security Archives: 2004) of the US based on declassified documents suggests that State Department analysts in 1983 proves that China was assisting with the production of fissile materials and possibly with the design of weapons in Pakistan. According to the latest report of the Defence Intelligence Agency of the United States, Pakistan’s modernization programme of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is dependent on the material and technology supplies by China. One cannot rule the ongoing nuclear collaboration between India and China even now as both consider India as their common opponent and both have developed strategic and economic nexus over the years, mainly after the decline of US strategic role in the region. In nutshell, in broader sense the nuclear nexus between China and Pakistan is a distinct source of nuclear threat for India.

India’s Nuclear Doctrine, 2003

India’s Nuclear Doctrine is a set of guidelines and norm to be followed in the development and use of nuclear weapons. Its important points are:

1. Building and Maintaining Credible Nuclear Deterrence- India’s nuclear weapons are defensive in nature with the purpose of deterring opponent from aggression. But this deterrence needs to be credible and reliable to be effective.
2. No-First Use Principle– India will not be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons. It will use nuclear weapons only as a retaliation to the nuclear weapons used against India. Also, India will not use nuclear weapons against the states which do not have nuclear weapons.
3. Massive Nuclear Retaliation– Since India will follow no-first use policy, it has to develop the capability of massive retaliation in case nuclear weapons are first used by adversary. This reflects on the safety and size of India’s nuclear weapon inventory. For this purpose, India has developed nuclear triad- a capability to launch nuclear weapons from air, sea and ground.
4. Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons against India will Trigger Nuclear Response-  The biological and chemical weapons are also weapons of mass destruction. If India faces the attack of these weapons, it may trigger nuclear response to ensure her security. Thus, nuclear weapons are also deterrence against other weapons of mass destruction.
5. Nuclear Retaliation to be controlled by Civilian Leadership- Unlike in Pakistan where the effective control over nuclear weapons rest with the military, India’s nuclear weapons and their use is strictly under the control of civilian authorities.
6. Continued Commitment to the Nuclear Weapons-Free World– Though India has developed nuclear capability to ensure her security in view of specific regional factor, she continues to be committed to the nuclear free world or comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

The analysis of these elements of India’s nuclear doctrine reals that India is finally committed to nuclear disarmament, but it has to keep her nuclear option open only due to nuclear threats arising in the region. Yet, India’s nuclear weapons are not only under the civilian control, but they are also meant for her defence not offence. That is why India is in favour of developing only minimum but credible nuclear deterrence. The no-first use principle defines the very nature of India’s nuclear weapons.

Comparative Analysis of Nuclear Capabilities and Strategies of India and Pakistan

Since India’s nuclear threats emanate from Pakistan’s nuclear behavior and perceptions, it is appropriate to take note of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines and capabilities. Though the size of nuclear weapons is admitted by any country, yet as the estimates of SIPRI (2025), in 2025, China has stockpile of 600 warheads, India has 180 warheads and Pakistan has 170 warheads. Though Pakistan has both categories of nuclear weapons (strategic and nuclear weapons) its nuclear arsenal is dominated by tactical nuclear weapons to be used by her in the battle field to deter India from massive conventional strike.

Following 1998 nuclear test, Pakistan has not officially declared any nuclear doctrine so far. It considers the ambiguity about its nuclear doctrine as its strength against India. Unlike India and China, Pakistan does not follow the no-first use principle. The former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division, Khalid Kidwai identified four threshold or redlines for the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan:  Spatial Threshold, meaning loss of large part of territory; Military Threshold, meaning substantial destruction of Pakistani armed forces; Economic Threshold, meaning economic strangulation; and Political Threshold, political destabilization or internal political subversion. The former president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf in 2002 stated that “nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India,” and would only be used if “the very existence of Pakistan as a state” was at stake. During the 1999 Kargil War, Pakistan’s then-foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed warned that the country would not “hesitate to use any weapon” to defend its territory. Later US US intelligence indicated that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible deployment.

Thus, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is highly subjective and may lead to use of nuclear weapons even at the low level of these thresholds. Moreover, the Nuclear weapons of Pakistan are not effectively under the civilian control, raising the possibility of their use by the army for their survival. Secondly, Pakistan’s focus on tactical nuclear weapons necessarily involves their decentralized control and command at the battleground. This necessitates their frequent transportation at short notice. This gives rise to the strong possibility of these weapons falling into jihadi hands – a fear that cannot be taken lightly in the epicentre of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism (IDSA: 2016). In brief, Pakistan’s focus on tactical nuclear weapons for a limited use, control of armed forces over nuclear weapons, and their possibility of falling in the hands of terrorist groups are the factors which give rise to the substantial nuclear threat for India. Pakistan is using nuclear blackmail against India to deter India from the massive conventional operation and involve third parties (Global actors like US and China) in conflict between India and Pakistan conflict.

There seems to be four strategic moves by India to address this challenge. First is India’s cold start doctrine under which India would respond quickly in limited manner to ward off any threat from Pakistan. The cold start doctrine evolved after India’s undue delay in mobilizing her force against Pakistan under Operation Parakram following terrorist attack in India Parliament in December, 2001. The three surgical strikes following terrorist attacks in 2016, 2019 and 2025 are the outcome of this new strategy. Second, India has targeted only the selected terrorist structures so far to give a message that India is following a policy of zero tolerance towards Pakistan originated terrorism. Third, India has frequently convened through both diplomatic and highest political channels that it would not succumb to nuclear blackmail. Fourth, India continues to strengthen her nuclear retaliation capabilities and preparedness for low insanity nuclear conflict or event of radiation in any form. Also, India has modified her no-first use principle by incorporating chemical and biological weapons as exception to this rule. There are chances that Pakistan may resort to these weapons in future.