With the recent visit of Tarique Rahman, PM of Bangladesh to China on 24-26 June, 2026, once again, the impact of China factor in South Asia has assumed added significance. By this visit, Rahman has not just ignored India’s security concerns but has tried to embolden China’s strategic presence in Bangladesh, which was immune from such impact for last 15 years during the Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League rule (2009-2024). This Article takes into account the increasing strategic footprints of China in India and concerns for India.
In the post-Cold War era, India took many foreign policy initiatives with changing global environment. Some of these initiatives are: Look East Policy, 1991 (Now known as Act East) to extend and strengthen partnership with East Asian countries, Gujral Doctrine, 1997, and the revamped Neighbourhood First Policy, 2014 to ensure peace, stability development and friendly ties in South Asia; Connect Central Asia Policy, 2012 to develop partnership with five Central Asian republics; and Think West policy to improve ties with countries in the West Asia. However, India’s policy initiatives have received desired success in all areas except in her neighbourhood. In South Asia, India’s policy interventions like Gujral Doctrine and the Neighbourhood First Policy did not score the desired success, in spite of the fact that India pushed ahead the principle of Non-Reciprocity (Gujral Doctrine). The principle of non-reciprocity calls for India’s partnership with and development assistance to her neighbours without expecting the reciprocal treatment from them. India just wants her security considerations to be accounted for in the region. India’s The Neighbourhood First policy, conceived in 2008 and pushed since beginning of Modi regime in 2014, inter alia, is aimed at enhancing physical, digital and people to people connectivity across the region, as well as augmenting trade and commerce. This policy has evolved into an institutional priority for all the relevant arms of the Government managing relations and policies with our neighbourhood (MEA:2025). In essence the policy aims to foster strong and friendly relations with neighbours on a consultative, outcome-oriented, and non-reciprocal basis (Shivamurthy: 2025). Beginning with his foreign visit to Bhutan in South Asia in June 2014, Indian PM has made many visits to neighbouring countries to ensure the favourable outcome of this policy. During his all 3 Oath taking Ceremonies in 2014, 2019 and 2024, the leaders of South Asian countries were invited as special guests. A major share of India’s foreign grants is directed in south Asia only. For example, in the 2025-26 Budget of Indian government, an amount of Rs 5483 crores was allocated for foreign grants, out of which seven SAARC countries (excluding Pakistan but including Myanmar) received Rs 4320 crores (Indian Budget: 2025).
Yet, India is faced with many challenges in South Asia itself: Nepal’s Maoist tilt and rising nationalism against India, Sri Lanka’s balancing game between India and China, Maldives’ India Out Campaign, and now Bangladesh’s foreign policy tantrums speak aloud about India’s difficulties. Bhutan, a close ally of India is facing heat from China to settle boundary with latter by ceding strategically important Doklam area. Doklam area is important for India as it overlooks India’s Chicken Neck, the narrow corridor linking mainland India with her North-East region. India has been trying in 2024 to support Bhutan diplomatically, but it is doubtful how long Bhutan will be able to avoid aggressive postures of India. What is common factor in all these cases? It is mainly China factor which complicates India’s policy trajectory. Pakistan has already developed all weather strategic partnership with China. Thus, India’s problems in South Asia emerge largely from the changing strategic environment in the region due to bold strategic footprints made by China in the region in last two decades.
China’s Strategic Push in South Asia
China emerged as anew nation following the 1949 communist revolution. India supported the entry of new China in global horizon and tried to develop rule-based ties with her. The Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 between the two nations, consisting of five principles – respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs of each other, Mutual benefit and equality, and peaceful co-existence- was devised as a framework guiding their ties in future. However, China was more guided by her historical ‘Middle Kingdom Syndrome’ than by the principles of Panchsheel. This led to China following aggressive expansionist policy in Tibet and finally Indo-China war in 1962. Nepal India’s defeat in this war was the first major factor which changed perception of India’s neighbours towards both China and India. Nepal and Pakistan were first to fall within the ambit of his new perception for different reasons- former for reducing reliance on India and latter for countering India. Pakistan, in a boundary settlement agreement with China in 1963, transferred 5000 sq kms of POK (Gilgit Baltistan) land in Shaksgam Valley to China. After this war in 1960s, Nepal’s King Mahendra, seeking to reduce reliance on India, cultivated closer ties with China, including the construction of the Arniko Highway also known as the Kodari Highway. This highway, completed in 1967 with Chinese assistance, was the first road link between Nepal and China across the Himalayas.
Still China has to wait many decades to launch her global outreach in South Asia or anywhere due to her internal limitations. The economic and defence modernization of China since her Open-Door Policy in 1978, facilitated by globalization made China and emerging power in the first decade of 21st century. China’s rise was articulated as Chinas Dream in due course in 2013, which marks the strategic and economic expansion of China in may regions including South Asia. The BRI is the economic instrument for realizing China Dream. China’s economic and strategic outreach in South Asia can be understood with China growing ties with India’s neighbours in last two decades.
Pakistan
China and Pakistan have developed close strategic and economic ties. Pakistan’s tilt towards China emanates from her deeply harboured desire since her independence to seek parity with India by taking the shelter of great powers at any cost. China and Pakistan share a common strategic perspective towards India: to contain her. In 1970s, China helped Pakistan to acquire nuclear and missile capability, offered diplomatic and political support to Pakistan against India in different diplomatic forums like UN on issues such as conflict and terrorism and transferred advanced weapons to Pakistan. Since 2014, China ahs invested more than $60 billion in Pakistan under the CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) projects, which among other things, gives China access to Arabian Sea through the China developed Gwadar Port in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. In May, 2025 during Operation Sindoor launched by India, China came forward to offer her political support to Pakistan. Now both claim their ties as ‘all weather friendship, higher than Himalayas and deeper than Oceans’.
Nepal
Communist and Maoist parties rose in Nepal in the wake of democratic movement (1990-2008) against Nepal’s Monarchy. Since 2008, the Communist Party of Nepal has followed pro-China policy as and when they have come to power. Its leader KP Sharma Oli, the present Prime Minister of Nepal remained aligned with China and raised many controversial issues with India including the Kalapani border disputed. The Communist regimes have fomented anti-India sentiments particularly after the 2016 agitation by Madhesis. Under Oli regime, Nepal joined China’s BRI in 2017 and signed transit agreement with China as an alternative to trade routes passing through India. Now China is poised to develop Trans-Himalayan connectivity with Nepal to make further inroads in Nepal. Chinese tourists have thronged Kathmandu and China has financed the teaching of Chinese language and Confucian ideology in Nepal. In terms of trade and investment in Nepal, though India is still ahead of China, but later is fast catching up. China accounted for 14.5percent of foreign direct investment in Nepal in 2021, while India accounted for 33.3percent. During 1995-2022, Chinese exports to Nepal have increased at an annual rate of 13.9 percent, from $53.4 million to $1.78 billion in the same period (Ghosh:2024).
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka and India have largely maintained mutually beneficial relations, but the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka has created lasting tensions between the two nations. India’s support to Tamils, demanding autonomy within Sri Lanka, is taken as interference by India in her internal affairs. With this perception, the first Rajapaksa regime (2005-15) developed close economic and strategic ties with China. During this period, the total Chinese investment in Sri Lanka reached nearly $6 billion. The significant infrastructure projects undertaken by China in Sri Lanka include Hambantota port, Katunayake-Colombo Expressway, the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, Maththala Airport, Colombo port city Project, 661-room Shangri La hotel and the Center for Performing Arts in Colombo. Sri Lanka has handed over Humbantota port to China on 99 -year lease in 2017 as she was not able to play loans to China. The Hambantota would allow China to have dominance over a vast area of the Indian Ocean extending from Australia in the east, Africa in the west and up to Antarctica in the south. From her investments, China tries to get other benefits like strategic advantages, diplomatic mileage and goodwill (IPCS: 2013). However, during Sri Lanka’s economic crisis in 2022, India was quick to advance financial assistance and supply of essential commodities. Sri Lanka has played hide and seek with respect to India security concerns as Chinese submarines and research ships visit Sri Lankan ports. During PM Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka on 6 April, 2025, President Dissanayake reiterated that Sri Lankan territory will not be allowed to be used by anyone to undermine India’s security. Both countries have signed various agreements including one on defence cooperation (Al Jazeera: 2025). This was Modi’s fifth visit to Sri Lanka since 2015. In spite by change in posture of Sri Lanka, the deep presence of China in Sri Lanka cannot be discounted. Sri Lanka is most likely to play a balancing policy between India and China.
Maldives
Maldives is strategically located on the India Ocean Sea lanes of communication and trade. Maldives also went for democratic reforms in 2008, but has experienced political instability and political polarization among political groups giving scope for China to make head way in Maldives. Mohamed Nasheed became the first democratically elected President of Maldives and followed friendly policies towards India. The opposition leader Yameen Abdul Gayoom won the second controversial elections in 2013. Gayoom was considered pro – China and his term (2013-18) saw China gaining economic and strategic foothold in Maldives. China-Maldives strategic engagement received fresh impetus after the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping historic visit in September, 2014. Beijing has invested huge funds in the form of loans for big projects in Maldives like $830 million project to upgrade the airport, including a 1.3-mile bridge (Called Friendship Bridge) to link the Hulhule Island with the capital Male. The China has also funded a hospital and a 1,000-apartment housing project on Hulhumale, a suburb built on reclaimed land. China had emerged as a ubiquitous presence in the Maldivian infrastructure, trade, and energy sectors. Yameen amended the Constitution in 2015 to allow foreign ownership of land in projects with investments of more than $1 billion, which facilitated land grab by China in Maldives. The Maldives has leased an uninhabited Island called Feydhoo Finolhu to a Chinese company in $ 04 million rent for 50 years to develop infrastructure for tourism.
Yameen made a successful four-day visit to China in December, 2017 and declared China amongst the Maldives’s closest friends and most trusted and most dependable development partners. During this visit, both signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on December 8, 2017. This is the first FTA signed by Maldives with any country. Maldives has become the second South Asian country after Pakistan to sign an FTA with China. In August 2017, three Chinese warships docked in the Maldives for joint training sessions. In February, 2018, 11 Chinese warships reportedly sailed into the eastern Indian Ocean to deter an Indian intervention in the Maldives during national emergency. China’s presence on Maldives’ northernmost atoll, which lies in the middle of international sea lanes, caused concerns in India.
However, the third elections in Maldives were held and 2018 and pro-India MDP, this time led by Mohammed Solih gained the power. Solih regime (2018-2023) followed ‘India First’ policy and India’s relations with Maldives were further strengthened during this period. But, opposition leader Mohamed Muizzu won the fourth election in September on the ‘India Out’ campaign to challenge the government policies. Muizzu asked the withdrawal of India defence personnel from Maldives and adopted pro-China policies. Like Sri Lanka, India PM Modi’s visit to Maldives on 26 July, 2025 has facilitated some reset of relations between India and Maldives (Kumar:2025). Yet, China’s looming strategic and economic presence in Maldives is a factor to be noticed.
Bhutan
Bhutan has experimented with limited constitutional democracy since 2008, King still being the respected head of the state. Bhutan has maintained close ties with India over the years. Being a small country, Bhutan has shunned diplomatic with P-5 countries including China. But, right now Bhutan is facing tremendous pressure from China on boundary dispute to hand over strategic are Doklam to China in lieu of China relinquishing her claims in northern and eastern areas (Joshi: 2023). India would not like China to grab Doklam and it has conveyed its concerns during Bhutanese king’s two recent visits to India. Doklam, located at the tri-junction of Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan holds strategic importance for India as it overlooks India’s vulnerable and narrow Siliguri Corridor, only highway linking mainland India with her North-Eastern region. Amidst ongoing China-Bhutan boundary talks, latter is putting pressure on Bhutan to establish diplomatic ties.
Bangladesh
After the forced resignation of Awami League’s Premier Sheikh Hasina on 5 August, 2024 in the wake of mass protests launched by students, the new government led by Muhammad Yunus has raised new concerns in India. During Sheikh Hasina regime (2009-2024) India and Bangladesh enjoyed close ties as her Awami League party are considered friendly to India (Roy:2024). Sheikh Hasina led government was sincere to India’s security concerns as China failed to gain foothold in Bangladesh during this period. Even Bangladesh government canceled the Sonadia port (Bay of Bengal) contract with China in 2017 as China’s another presence in the Bay of Bengal region raised new security concerns.
The rise of opposition forces like BNP and Jamaat-e- Islami in Bangladesh under Muhammad Yunus led regime may pose many challenges for Indian policy makers in China as both these groups are considered pro-China as well as pro-Pakistan. This change may pose new problems for India like the security of long border, safety of minority Hindu population in Bangladesh, slow-down in the trade, investment, development partnership and the connectivity project. But, this change may also give a new opportunity to China to make strategic forays very near to India’s border. Yunus made a four day visit to China on 26-29 March, 2025 and sought China’s investment in Bangladesh. He called on China to reduce interest rates for Chinese loans and waive commitment fees on Chinese-funded projects. Yunus sought Beijing’s help in facilitating the relocation of the Chinese manufacturing industries, including ready-made garments, electric vehicles, light machinery, high-tech electronics, chip manufacturing and the solar panel industry. (The Hindu: 2025). He also raised the possible corridor between China and Bangladesh through India’s North East, which was objected by India.
The new government led by BNP leader Tarique Rahman assumed power in Bangladesh in February 2026 following general elections. Ignoring India’s invitation, he first visited China and signed many agreements with China which may raise concern in India.
Tarque Rahman’s China Visit, 2026
The new Prime Minister of Bangladesh and BNP leader Tarique Rahman has made his maiden foreign visit to Malaysia and China. He visited China on 24-26 June, 2026, which can be termed as strategically important for India for its wide implications. It should be noted that Indian PM Modi has sent her best wishes to Rahman when he assumed power on 17 February, 2026 and also sent invitation to visit India. It has been a tradition in neighbouring countries that their new leaders after assuming power make their maiden visit to India, in view of close historical ties and mutual dependence on each other. India’s Neighbourhood First Policy also aims at facilitating close ties with her neighbours. But ignoring all these practices and principles, Rahman made his first visit to Malaysia and China.
During his China visit, without naming India, both countries displayed a kind of strategic understanding against India. The Chinese President Xi Jinping assured Bangladesh to protect its sovereignty and independence. This was an indirect reference to their narrative that India is interfering in the internal affairs of her neighbours and undermining their sovereignty and independence. The important highlights of the Rahman visit to China are mentioned below:
1.Teesta River Management Project- On the request of Bangladesh, both countries have agreed to cooperate in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. China will prepare feasibility report for implementing this project. This project is located in north Bangladesh, very close to India’s narrow Siliguri Corridor linking mainland India with her North-eastern region. Thus, this project has drawn attention of India. It should be noted that this project was to be launched by India during Sheikh Hasina regime, but due to technical delays it could not be implemented in time and now it has gone to China. Bangladesh has been demanding for conclusion of Teesta river water sharing agreement, but that could not be sighed due to opposition from the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee. If China executes this project, a large number of Chinse engineers and other workers will be present very near to Indian border, which may pose security concerns in India as China often employs its military workers also in such projects.
2. Proposal for China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Corridor– Both countries also agreed in principle to launch this trilateral corridor by passing India. It should be noted that this project was initially mooted by China in 2013 in the form of BCMI (Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, India) corridor, but due India’s sensitivity, it could not be implemented. Now this project launched by India will encircle India in the eastern side though land and maritime presence of China.
3. Thirteen Bilateral Agreements: Both countries signed 13 MoUs for cooperation in various areas including investment, human resource development, education (including introducing Mandarin in Bangladesh), and media collaboration.
4.Global Development Initiative (GDI)- During this visit Bangladesh has agreed to join China-led Global Development Initiative (GDI). It is seen by observers as strategic alignment between the two nations with long term consequences. By this strategic alignment with China, Bangladesh wants to balance its historical ties with India.
Afghanistan And Myanmar
Besides, China has also made strategic inroads in Afghanistan and Myanmar, which are India’s two key neighbours. In Afghanistan, China enjoys close proximity with Taliban regime after the departure of US forces from Afghanistan August, 2021. Earlier, this closeness was facilitated by Pakistan. China has hosted Taliban delegation many ties. China, Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to extend the CPEC corridor up to Afghanistan (Sajid: 2025). India is yet to restore diplomatic ties with Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Myanmar’s democracy received setback in February 2021, when Military captured the political power and imprisoned democratic leaders. Since then, Myanmar is embroiled in violent civil war between resistant groups and army regime. China has not deterred from supplying arms to the military regime and positioned herself as mediator between the two countries. Also, China earlier developed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor linking China with Myanmar’s port of Kyuakpyu in Bay of Bengal. India’s presence in Bay of Bengal raises concerns for India’s Kaladan connectivity project linking India’s Kolkata ort with Mizoram state through Sittwe port in Myanmar (near to China developed Kyaukpyu port). Though India has followed a pragmatic policy towards Myanmar during last two decades, yet China’s economic and strategic influence in Myanmar is a fact to be underlined.
Why China’s New Strategic Push in South Asia?
China has always been a factor in South Asia, but China’s economic and strategic push in South Asia during last two decades is unprecedented. China’s active strategic push gives a viable option to India’s neighbours to ignore Indian concerns by playing balancing game between India and China. There are certain fundamental regions for this outreach of China in South Asia:
First, it is a part of her larger strategy to emerge as a global power. China has already expanded its influence in the East Asian and Central Asia region and would like to cover South Asia to emerge as a leading global power by the year 2049 when it completes 100 years of its Communist revolution. This is what we call Xi Jinping’s China Dream.
Second, this is a coincidence that India’s too emerged as competing power to China in the region. Both try to contain each other by diverse strategies: India tries to balance China in in East Asia (India’s Act east Policy) and China’s strategy in South Asia. Thus, containing emerging India in her neighbourhood becomes imperative for China. Thus, it is also a counter to India’s push in East Asia under the Look East Policy as well her strategic partnership with the US and other partners (e.g. QUAD).
Third, China’s strategy may still not succeed in South Asia, if it does not find hospitable ground. China’s economic and strategic strength in the region works both as an attraction as well as fear for India’s South Asian neighbours. They are attracted to China’s economic rise and its benefits and also fear antagonizing a rising nation in the neighbourhood. This cocktail of material attraction and psychological fear among India’s neighbours is the fundamental challenge for India’s policy in south Asia. This changing strategic environment has serious implications not only for India’s security but also for the peace, stability, development and economic integration in South Asia. Thus, for India, more than China’s strategy, the outlook of her neighbours towards China is more aunting challenge for India.
The Way Ahead for India
These factors promote China’s active presence and outreach in South Asia. Thus, China’ economic and strategic reach is a fact of prevailing strategic environment in South Asia. It is no more a one-time development. India need to fashion her Neighbourhood Policy to safeguard her core interests by taking in to consideration the two basic factors: China’s strategic and economic outreach in South Asia is a permanent fact now; and how India’s neighbours are attracted to and fear from China’s economic and military presence. India has neither the economic resources to match China nor China like orientation to generate fear among her neighbours. Thus, India needs to take innovative approach to rope in third parties for strengthening her development partnership in South Asia. Japan, South Korea, Australia, France and other countries should be partnered to launch a robust development partnership in South Asia on reciprocal basis. As a second component, India should try to strengthen a rule-based order in the region to address China’s aggressive diplomacy. Though Quad is robust forum, yet its focus lies in Asia -pacific region. A new QUAD-like mechanism needs to be put in place in South Asia also to hedge against China’s economic and strategic outreach.
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