Geopolitics and Strategy of Cross-Border Religious Terrorism in India

Religious terrorism in India is basically a cross-border terrorism originating in Pakistan. Among other things, as a part of her strategy, India has been trying to isolate Pakistan in global community on the ground of its sustained support to cross-border terrorism for long time. This isolation strategy intensified since the Pulwama terror attack of 2019 and Pahalgam attack of 2025. India has raised  this issue in global forums like UN Bodies, SCO, BRICS etc as well as in bilateral diplomatic engagements with other countries. But India’s success remains patchy in this respect. See the facts: Pakistan was removed from the Grey List of Financial Action Task Force (FATF-a global anti-terror financing and anti-money laundering Forum) ) in 2022; IMF approved two distinct loans to Pakistan in 2023 and 2024 (India opposing it); Pakistan signs a mutual defence and security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2025; America embracing Pakistan’s military regime; and Pakistan emerging as a lead mediator in the US-Iran war in 2026. These facts reveal that the global community is least concerned with Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism and countries are willing to engage with Pakistan as and when it serves their own interests. There is no global  sustained fight against terrorism. Countries including India have to fend for themselves.

In the light of this observation, this article analyzes the strategy and geopolitics of religious terrorism in India.

Terrorism has emerged as a global challenge in last few decades. This is more so since the 9/11, which led to the US led global war on terror on Af-Pak region, considered to be the epicenter of the global terrorism.  Besides this military option, as usual the global community under the banner of UN tries to evolve a consensus on the terrorism as a global threat. Though the UN succeeded in formulating the International Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism could not be passed by the UN General Assembly since 1996 as members could not even agree on the definition of terrorism. The fundamental problem is that while the challenge of terrorism is global, the perceptions about terrorism are national. The crux of the issue is as to how to distinguish the purpose of terrorist violence with similar violence involved in the context of national liberation movements of self-determination (Diaz-Paniagua: 2008). The definition proposed in this Convention notes that any unlawful and intentional act causing serious damage to human life or private property with the intention of intimidating people or compelling any government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act, may be termed as an act of terrorism. The lack of an acceptable and binding definition has undermined the coordinated and concerted efforts of the international community to fight international terrorism (UNGA: 2002).

In the absence of a comprehensive convention, the UN has adopted a sectoral approach to deal with this problem. Accordingly, UNGA has adopted 11 conventions since 1963 dealing with various specific aspects of terrorism like financing of terrorism or nuclear terrorism and so on. However, member states have formulated definition of terrorism under national laws to deal with problem. The Chapter 113 B of the US Code 18 defines ‘international terrorism’ with three characteristics: Violent acts dangerous to human life and violate state law; influence the policy or operation of the government by mass destruction; assassination or kidnapping; and transcend national boundaries in terms of means or targeted people or place of operation (FBI: 2015). This is working definition used by the US authorities to deal with acts of terrorism. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (now lapsed) defines terrorist activities. In essence, it includes all those dangerous activities, which are carried out with lethal means with the intention of intimidating government or striking terror in the minds of people. Whatever may the motive, strategy or goals of terrorism, the disproportionate violence and fear are the fundamental elements of any act of terror.

          While the debate on the nature and strategy of terrorism is going on, terrorism itself has shaped and reshaped in changing conditions. Its network, lethal capacity and frequency have increased. In spite of many global efforts, the terrorist activities registered fivefold increase in less than two decades from nearly 2000 in 2001 to 10900 in 2017. In the year 2017, in the terror related events, more than 26,400 people were killed, including 8,075 perpetrators and 18,488 victims. In recent past, the terrorist violence peaked in 2014 as nearly 17,000 terrorist attacks took place with more than 45,000 total deaths caused in these attacks (GTD: 2019). The emergence of Islamic State in 2014 posed a new threat in the Middle East. Though, the US and others have announced the decimation of IS in March 2019, but battle against terrorism is not over. The terror groups have shown their strategic flexibility in utilizing the modern means of mass media and information technology. They tend to expand their recruitment base as well as financial networks at global level.

Terrorism in India

It is in the general global scenario that India continues to suffer the heavy toll of men and material inflicted by both religious and non-religious groups across the country.  If we review of the trajectory of terrorism in India in last three decades, it assumed serious proportion in late 1980s, continued to stabilized and controlled till 2007 and again picked up a rising trend till now. As per the information compiled by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD: 2019), the terrorist activities dramatically increased in India from double digit in 1980s to 390 in 1991. Terrorist activities show down turn for a decade and subsequently decreased to 190 in 2007. There has been an upswing in terror activities since then which reached 1000 in 2017, causing serious concerns to the peace and security in the country, particularly in the affected regions. On the basis of motivation, goals and geographic settings, the terrorism in Indian can be broadly classified into three categories: Maoist-Leninist Terrorism; Ethnic terrorism and Religious Terrorism.

The Maoist-Leninist Terrorism, known as Naxalism has been declared as the grave internal security threat by India. It is largely concentrated in the rural and tribal areas of central and Eastern parts of India. Naxalism, motivated by Maoist-Leninist ideology, originating in mid 1960s, receives supports from relatively less developed regions and aims to capture political power to implement their ideology through the strategy of violence and gradual infiltration from rural areas to urban centres of India.

The Ethnic terrorism, in the North-Eastern parts of India, originated in 1960s, is motivated by a distinct ethno-nationalism seeks to carve out a separate or autonomous political domain through the strategy of violence and support from ethnic population.

The Religious Terrorism has been a pan Indian feature since the partition of India, but now it is highly concentrated in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, though it has selected targets in Central and North India from Mumbai, Varanasi, and Delhi to Srinagar. In its present phase it took shape in late 1980s in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and gradually spread to other areas of India and has assumed serious  dimension with the cross-border support. The focus of this Article is on the geopolitics and strategy of religious terrorism in India.

Nature of Religious Terrorism

According to a noted scholar Rapoport (2001), the religious terrorism is the fourth1 and contemporary wave of terrorism, which started around 1990s and displays a dramatic change in the motivation of terrorism.  Making religion as a motive of terrorism is fundamental shift and an unprecedented situation. He suggests that religious terrorism is a global phenomenon.  A terrorism by be called religious terrorism if its terror acts are either inspired by religious beliefs or directed at religious goals or both. Juergensmeyer (2000) argues that religious terrorism is more violent as it treats to God as a final authority and finds no need of compromise with lesser public authorities; the face-saving during negotiation does not deter it from disproportionate violence; and it is performance oriented in order to reach to broader audience. In the religious terrorism, the radical religious ideology is a significant tool of justification of and support for violence. Under this framework of religious ideology, the violence perpetrated by the ‘oppressed’ in-group is legitimized against the ‘crusader’ out-group. In context of terrorism, the religious ideology usually means ideology as a narrative; providing individuals with an identity, a purpose, as a tool of emotional empowerment, a sense of significance and brotherhood’ as well as a sense of redemption and atonement for sin and past shame (Heide: 2018).

Why the kind of terrorism visible in Kashmir and supported by cross-border actors is called a religious terrorism? It is because this brand of terrorism is partly inspired by religious beliefs and seeks justification on religious grounds. However, its goals are not religious,  though some of its important actors like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) announce that it wants to establish an Islamic order not just in Kashmir but the entire south Asia. This declared goal, in fact, is the tool to get support and justification for their activities. The dynamics of this brand of religious terrorism can be explained with the help of three parameters: its geopolitics, strategy and actual goals. While the geopolitics of  terrorism is concerned with its geographic representation and practice, the strategy deals with the tools, support base and modus operandi of terrorists to realize their goals, which appear to be non-religious in the instant case.

The Geopolitics of Religious Terrorism

The geopolitical factors play an important role in the Kashmir related religious terrorism in India. What is the common point between the three regions: Chechnya (Russia), Xinjiang (China), and Kashmir (India) located in Western border (North West or South West) of the three large countries?  One may argue that the common point between the three regions is that they are Muslim majority region, that they are fighting again their states for more autonomy or even separation, and that they have shown the tendency of religious militancy and terrorism in various measures in recent years. These points are valid.  But there is another similarity between the three regions. These three Muslim majority regions (from North to South) are located on the eastern flank of Islamic mainland, where they confront three large non-Islamic political regimes, in their efforts to consolidate and expand their hold.  This struggle has been going on for centuries, though their means have been changing with change in times from open war and rebellion to extremism, militancy and terrorism. The transitional territorial zones between different religious and ethnic communities always produce similar tensions, but we tend to view them in segmented time periods. A closer look at these three regions in historical perspective may verify this assumption.

Chechnya is located in southwestern Russia on the northern flank of the Greater Caucasus range. Chechnya is bordered by Russia proper and other republics on the north, east, southeast and West, and Georgia on the southwest. Chechnya Muslims have been fighting against Russia for centuries to maintain their independence. Finally, after decades of violent resistance, Chechnya was conquered by Russia in 1858. Since then though Chechnya has been largely under Soviet control but after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the militant movement for independence gained momentum with greater in separatism and violence and counter repressive measures by Russian forces. Russia sent her forces in 1994 to quell the insurgency and militancy by Chechen Muslims.  In October 2002 a group of Chechen militants seized a Moscow theatre and took nearly 700 spectators and performers hostage. In the ensuing rescue operation, some 130 hostages died. Tough, finally Russia subjugated the region in 2009, but Jihadists, including those aligned with Islamic State and al-Qaeda, remain active in the region, with  further possibility of religious terrorism taking a violent turn (Encyclopedia  Britannica: 2019; and BBC: 2018) .

Xinjiang, literally meaning “new frontier’ in Chinese language, is an autonomous territory of China and is located in her the northwest border. The region is home of many ethnic groups, including the majority Turkic Uyghur Muslim community. In ancient times, the Xinjiang region was thinly populated by herders and farmers organized into small kingdoms and tribal alliances. China took interest in the region as it was on the way to ancient silk route which was the main trade route between China and Roman Empire through West Asia. With the As the Han power declined in the 3rd century CE, the area passed under the control of local Uighur leaders. But with the resurgence Tang imperial power (618–907) China’s influence in the region again increased. As Tang power decreased in the late 9th and early 10th centuries, Arab influence increased, and Islam gained many converts. The Turkic language came to be spoken in Xinjiang. Eventually the Uyghurs assimilated the previous people of the region; the whole region came under Mongol rule later and was eventually completely Islamicized by the 14th century.  The Qing dynasty of China (1644–1911/12) successfully asserted control over the Xinjiang region, defeating the resistance of stubborn tribes in the north and sending loyal Muslims to settle in northern Xinjiang in the 17th and 18th centuries. Eventually the Qing Dynasty conquered the now-poor area in the 18th century for strategic purposes. In 1884 the Qing government created a new Xinjiang province. (Pillalamarri: 2015; and Encyclopedia Britannica: 2019a).

Communist China exercised tight control over the region since 1949. Uyghurs were also subjected to Cultural Revolution (1966-76), but ethnic tensions again came to the fore following liberal economic reforms in China. The ethnic tensions between Uyghurs and Han have precipitated occasional Uighur protests and disturbances. A notable outbreak of violence occurred in July 2009 in Urumqi, during which scores of people were killed and hundreds were injured. The militancy has been on rise in recent years. The militancy is on rise since 2014. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an Islamic radical group of Uyghurs, is fighting for independence from China. Since 2014 China has also stepped up repressive measures to tame the Uyghur militancy and terrorism as around 13000 suspected extremists have been put behind bar and another 1 lakh Uyghurs have been sent prison like De-education camps for de-learning Muslim culture and re-leaning Han Chinese culture!

Jammu and Kashmir, located in the North-West frontier of India, is also a most restive region, infested with separatism, Islamic extremism and cross-border terrorism. The united Kashmir is situated at the frontier of Islamic mainland. The Kashmir region came under the Muslim rule in 1346 and continued as such for five centuries. Islam and Islamic culture were wide spread in the region and in interaction with existing Hindu and Buddhist culture laid the foundation for what is now called Kashmiriyat. The region was annexed by the Sikh kingdom in 1819.  For hundred years, it was ruled by Dogra rulers from 1846 to 1947, when it finally merged with the India Union. After that, the region continued to be strategic as the hotbed of Islamic extremism and the cross -border terrorism.

As long as the Kashmir’s existence was guaranteed by the British, the weaknesses in its structure and along its peripheries were not of great consequence, but they became apparent after the British withdrawal from India in 1947. The rulers of Princely state of Kashmir did not quell the Muslim militancy, largely supported by the newly established state of Pakistan in their western areas. The ruler appealed India for help and protection.  Consequently, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was integrated with India on 26 October 1947 through the Instrument of Accession, signed between the then ruler of state, Hari Singh and the Government of India. The two factors: the Muslim majority status of region, and its location at the religious and territorial boundary, both products of geopolitical factors, lured Pakistan to foment trouble in the region. This was the signal for intervention by Pakistan, which considered the state to be a natural extension of Pakistan. The 1947 Indo-Pak war was the results of these factors; which resulted in apparent victory of India, but a large chunk of territory of the state remained under the control of Pakistan. This territory is known as Pak-Occupied Kashmir (POK), which also includes Northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. The rest of Kashmir is under India’s control and the dividing line between the two is now known as Line of Control. While Pakistan calls POK as Azad Kashmir, she aims at liberating rest of the Kashmir under India’s control though the UN mediated plebiscite if possible, if not by war and if still not possible, by cross-border terrorism, the present phase of confrontation and violence in the Kashmir.

The foregoing discussion on the three restive Muslim majority regions situated on the frontier between the eastern flanks of Islamic mainland on the one hand and non-Muslim big states (India, China and Russia) on the other demonstrates the significance of geopolitical factors as stated below:

1. These Muslim majority regions have been subject to Islamic influence around 14th   century and ever since engaged in consolidating and asserting their Islamic identities in the face of non-Islamic world. The forced conversion, war and violence have been going on for centuries sometimes hidden and other times open. The present extremism, radicalization of religion, violence and terrorism especially appear to be the extension of the underlying geopolitical factors. Why it is so that India’s north-west frontiers have witnessed war, violence as well as stiff resistance while engaging with alien rulers and their attacks?

2. If terrorism is nothing but the present expression of geopolitics, the complete resolution of the problem of the underlying problems may not be possible till this geopolitical reality is altered.  On the contrary the present violence and religious resistance may assume new forms in future. Thus, the management of the problem, rather than its final resolution seems to be most viable option at hand.

3. The three non-Muslim states have adopted difference strategy to address and manage this problem at the frontier. While China and Russia have more often resorted to military and repressive means to restore peace stability on their own terms. China has also buttressed her strategy with both cultural and demographic changes along with military means (allow settlement of Han Chinese in Xinjiang, De-education camps for Uyghur Muslims a deployment of armed forces). How China succeeds, is yet to be seen. India’s strategy has been to go for gradual integration though constitutional and democratic means (Article 370 and Article 35A) and occasionally deployment of forces when situation goes out of hand, but it has proved inadequate in face of the separatists’ strategy, intertwined with cross-border interests and designs. Now the terrorism in Kashmir has entered into a homegrown suicide attack mode (Pulwama Attack, 14 February 2019), a difficult situation for India’s security establishment.

Strategy of Religious Terrorism in India

          It has been the tendency of the Indian establishment to attribute India’s religious terrorism to its cross-border origins, simultaneously downplaying its domestic bases.  The role of cross-border origin and support of religious terrorism cannot be denied, but without domestic fertile ground, it alone cannot succeed and reach to the height it has achieved now. Thus, the strategy of Kashmir based religious terrorism has two dimensions and both equally important: Domestic and External.

Domestic Dimensions 

It is usually argued that militancy and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir started in early 1990s as a handiwork of Pak based terror groups.  But the radicalization of people and youth with ideology of religious extremism has long roots in Kashmir. The process of radicalization has been going on for decades in the name of desirability of Islamic society, Azadi of Kashmir or call for more autonomy.  The seeds of extremism were shown in 1970s and 1980s by Jammat-e –Islami Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (both banned now). Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, a socio-political and religious organization was founded in 1945 as a chapter of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind during the Independence movement. It separated from its parent organization in 1953 over differences in political ideology. Jammat, with a pro-Pakistan leaning during the Plebiscite Front days and also during the eruption of militancy, pitches itself as socio-religious organization working mainly in the field of education and awareness about Islam. It has been spreading Islamic extremism for long time through it Madarsas in Kashmir valley. In the Social and political discourse on the future of Kashmir, Jamaat has been at the forefront to preach dissatisfaction with Indian rule in Kashmir, discredit the political process and local political leaders of Kashmir and criticized contemporary religious practices in Kashmir which they saw as un-Islamic. Jamaat has accused state political leaders of not following Quranic teachings.

The Jamaat expanded in size considerably in the 1950s with the support of educated youth and low and middle-ranking government servants.  ‘As opposition to Indian rule mounted, due to India’s failure to uphold its promises to the Kashmiri people, growing Hindu chauvinism, threats to Kashmiri Muslim identity, rigged elections of 1987, the failure of the state to provide jobs to an increasing number of educated youth in the public sector and the continued domination of the administrative service by Kashmiri Pandits, the Jamaat found an increase in its support’ (Sikand: 2002).  Its social credibility strengthened as it established a number of schools between1947-1952 and an expanded its activities in the media and mosques. By the 1970s the Jamaat became a respected organization.

The Jamaat-e-Islami was an influential founder member of the undivided Hurriyat Conference from its inception in 1993 till 2003. The Jamaat withdrew from the Hurriyat following its split in 2003 and decided to focus on its social work while maintaining its separatist stand on Kashmir issue (India Today: 2019).

Meanwhile, another separatist organization called Plebiscite Front (Mahaz-i-Raishumari) was foundedin Azad Kashmir by Amanullah Khan in 1965. Its militant wing called the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was formed in Birmingham in 1977 and its branches in Azad Kashmir and Indian Kashmir were established in 1982 and 1987 respectively. From 1987 to 1994, the JKLF was the most active militant organization in Kashmir valley. The accusation of rigging of 1987 Assembly elections gave JKLF an opportunity to broaden its base among youth and intensify its militant activities. Muslim United Front (MUF), a coalition of all Muslim political parties including Jamaat-e-Islami contested the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly elections in 1987 was its core constituent. The charges of rigging gave new impetus to JKLF militant activities. The JKLF waged a militant guerrilla war with the Indian security forces, with its target being the government and security officials. JKLF stood for the independence of Kashmir both from India and Pakistan, which was not appreciated by Pakistan, which stoped support to it. By the year 1992, the main cadre of JKLF was either killed or imprisoned by security forces. In 1994, it declared unilateral ceasefire and to wage political struggle for the liberation of Kashmir from India.

Meanwhile, the MUF inspired the formation of another separatist organization known as All parties Hurriyat Conference in 1993. Hurriyat experienced a formal split in 2003, following some of its leaders participating in the Assembly elections. However, at present, Hurriyat represents the voice of separatism in Kashmir and thus maintains close ties with Pakistan government. Thus, the gradual spread of separatism, and Islamic extremism since 1970s and militancy since 1980s in the valley, produced highly radicalized with separatist tendencies in Kashmir.

It has produced two consequences:

First, it discredited the political process and political leaders both. This is seen in the form of political leaders appeasing to separatists to gain political support in Kashmir and thus further strengthening the credibility of separatist elements.

Second, the spread of extremism, separatism, and militancy facilitated Pakistan to launch cross-border terrorism since early 1990s. This has changed the entire dynamics of terrorism in Kashmir, where domestic and external elements have joined hand with same mission.

External Dimension

The religious terrorism in India is primarily a cross-border terrorism originating from state of Pakistan as part of her overall strategy towards India.  Pakistan has invented support to terror and extremist as a state strategy to address her uncomfortable foreign relations: first with Afghanistan from 1979 to 1990 and thereafter in India since 1990 onwards. After the Afghan war over, the trained Jihadis were pushed into India in organized manner. This is not a mere coincidence that  majority of the terror groups or their predecessors like Harkat ul- Ansar, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e Mohammad were organized and reshaped during this period. These groups trained and supported by Pakistan deep state (Army and ISI) have selected high profile government and other targets in India. According to the data compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, during 1990-2017, more than 44000 persons were killed in Jammu and Kashmir due to terrorism; which includes 5100 security forces, 14000 civilians and 255000 terrorists.

What are the factors which motivate and sustain Pakistan strategy of state sponsored terrorism in India?

First, Pakistan was created on the promise of a separate home for Muslims on the basis of two-nation theory of Jinnah, which led to her Islamic identity. Pakistan state is bound to derive its legitimacy only and only by closely aligning with Sunni radical Islamic groups, which in turn maintain their base though extremism, Jihad and terrorism. Pakistan has never supported any non-Sunni and Non-Islamic terror groups.

Second, since Pakistan was created on the basis of partition of India on religious basis, its Islamic identity has to be claimed and asserted against Hindu India. Pakistan has been trying to gain military parity with India. Realizing her inability to win a conventional war with India, Pakistan Military turned toward subversive actions in the form of terrorism against India since early 1990s to extract some parity out of India’s troubles. Therefore, Terrorism against India is not supported by Pakistan Military, but terrorism is created by the military as its hidden field units.

Third, Pakistan found a hospitable environment in Kashmir valley, characterized by hostile attitude against India, separatism and extremism, cultivated since 1970s in Kashmir by domestic elements.

Fourth, the prevailing canons of geopolitics terrorism sustain Pakistan’s strategy of cross-border terrorism. The problem of terrorism is global, but it is addressed by nations on individual case basis. India has been trying to isolate Pakistan in global community on the ground of its sustained support to cross-border terrorism for long time but more specifically since the Pulwama terror attack of 2019 and Pahalgam attack of 2025. India has raised  this issue in global forums including UN bodies as well as in bilateral diplomatic engagements with other countries. But India’s success remains patchy in this respect. See the facts: Pakistan was removed from the Grey List of Financial Action Task Force (FATF-a global anti-terror financing and anti-money laundering Forum) ) in 2022; IMF approved two distinct loans to Pakistan in 2023 and 2024 (India opposing it); Pakistan signs a mutual defence and security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2025; America embracing Pakistan’s military regime; and Pakistan emerging as a lead mediator in the US-Iran war in 2026. These facts reveal that the global community is least concerned with Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism and countries are willing to engage with Pakistan as and when it serves their own interests. There is no global  sustained fight against terrorism.

Goals of Religious Terrorism

It is always debatable as what are the goals of Pakistan sponsored religious terrorism in India? Should terrorism be viewed as a political strategy of Pakistani State? Or it is a part of larger design of global Islamic terrorism dictated by geopolitical imperative?  Or it is both at the same time?

If we go by the narratives of the terror groups active in India and their global affiliates like Al Qaeda, terrorism in India appears to be a part of global Islamic Jihad. Both bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri has spoken about the ‘U.S-Jewish-Indian alliance’ or ‘Crusader-Zionist-Hindu’ conspiracy against the Islamic world. (Reidel: 2008). Leading terror groups active in India like JeM and LeT are closely associated with global Jihadi groups like Al Qaeda and Taliban and claim the desirability of Shria rule and appeal to Muslim Umma (Global Muslim Communiy).

However, if we look into the Pakistan’s state strategy to support and encourage terrorism against India, the Azadi of Kashmir appear its immediate goal. Pakistan has always tried to continue to maintain hold on terror groups operating in India since 1990 to realize her agenda. During early 1990s, Pakistan led the elimination of JKLF, because it wanted Azadi of Kashmir, both from Pakistan and India. If Pakistan is using terrorism as strategy to gain parity with India, she will continue to do so even if Kashmir issue is resolved. Pakistan will not oppose the global appeal of terror groups, because it gives them global credibility and support, but it will always ensure that terror groups remain under her control as the tool of her strategy in both India and Afghanistan and even may be in Iran. Roddin and Flint (2013) on the basis of their study on terrorism in India, also find that geopolitical and religious representation of terrorism should be tempered with the practice of terrorism in the light of non-religious goals (Emphasis added). Only possible scenarios in which Pakistan will disconnect with terror groups are: Pakistan denounces her goal of parity with India as a result of improvement in bilateral relations; and strengthening of democracy, where civilian government gains primacy over army and Islamic groups (Felbab-Brown: 2018).

Both are distant possibilities. But India has also missed two milestones to control violent insurgency in Kashmir: during 1970s, when separatism and extremism gained social acceptability at the cost of democratic political process; and again in early 1990s, when a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy was required to tame the fresh wave of terrorism at the initial stage. What India is doing now should have done three decades ago.

NOTES

1. Rapoport (2001) has identified four waves of terrorism in modern times:  The first wave of modern terrorism occurred, between 1880 and 1914 with the ideology of anarchism and its goals of revolutionary change against monarchies. The second wave of terrorism, occurred during 1920-1960, within a context of decolonization and national independence especially in formal colonies. The third wave of terrorism, during 1960-1990, maintained the nationalist motivations of the previous wave but added a twist of political ideology of extreme left and right and made a new geographical expression. The fourth wave of terrorism, roughly the 1990s to the present day, displays a continuation of this geographic trend but with a dramatic change in the motivation for terrorist activity.  It is known as religious terrorism.

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