What is Strategic Autonomy?
Strategic autonomy refers to a foreign policy poture of a country under which it is free to take decisions on core issues of foreign policy without any external pressure. Thus, freedom of decision-making in core issues of foreign policy is the crux of strategic autonomy. The core issues of foreign policy are related with strategic and long-term national interests of a country. However, maintaining the posture of strategic autonomy is contingent upon the capabilities of a nation and its will to use those capabilities to pursue strategic autonomy. According to a noted scholar Shashi Tharoor (2025), ‘Strategic autonomy refers to a nation’s ability to make sovereign decisions in foreign policy and defence without being constrained by external pressures or alliance obligations. He further warns that strategic autonomy should not be equated with isolationism and neutrality. Rather, it implies flexibility, independence and the capacity to engage with multiple powers on one’s own terms. Thus, strategic autonomy is not a negative posture but a positive and proactive posture to pursue national interests by a country without any external constraints.
Another feature of strategic autonomy is that it is dynamic in nature. It is contingent on the prevailing global distribution of power. Constraints and pathways of strategic autonomy change with the change in international power distribution. For example, during cold war bipolarity, strategic autonomy demanded balancing relations between the two power blocs (led by the US and Soviet Union) while maintaining autonomy in making foreign policy choices. However, with the change in bipolarity towards multipolarity in the post-cold war era, the strategic autonomy demands balancing relations and engagement with multiple power centres like Russia, China, US and other emerging powers.
Changing Landscape of India’s Strategic Autonomy
In the post-cold war era, strategic autonomy has gradually emerged as the core principle of Indian foreign policy. However, its roots are found in the India’s cold war policy of non-alignment. The policy of non-alignment had two dimensions: negatively, it wanted to avoid being part of military blocs of cold war era; but positively, it focused on following an independent policy line on each issue on the basis of its merit. In the final analysis, it purpose was to guard India’s free exercise of foreign policy choices. Among other things, the justification was advanced mainly on two counts: First, India has gained her independence after a long struggle, and it would not be wise to join a military bloc and be guided by its imperatives. Second, after independence, India was to focus on its own socio-economic development and joining any military bloc would have made India part of super powers rivalry and hence its socio-economic development would have affected. Thus, the policy of non-alignment was a viable option for India during cold war to protect its national interests. It called for not only keeping away from power blocs but also to fulfil India’s national interest by following an independent foreign policy. Also, the Non-alignment was not viewed as a dogmatic principle, rather a policy approach in service of national interest. That is why, India signed peace and friendship treaty with Soviet Union in 1971 to protect her territorial sovereignty, when the US supported Pakistan during the 1971 war. It was not as such violation of the non-alignment as some scholars have argued, but is an example of independence of foreign policy choice to protect her national interest.
Theoretically, the notion of strategic autonomy also retains the element of independence of policy, which was also the substance of non-alignment. However, the international landscape has undergone substantial changes in the post-cold war era. This has resulted in the operation of principle of strategic autonomy in practice. Now the global landscape has moved from bipolarity towards multipolarity, though it is still not a multipolar world as we understand. It is, in fact, a skewed and hybrid multipolarity which has traces of unipolarity, bipolarity as well as multipolarity. Unipolar element is that the US still continues to be the dominant power with largest economy, lead in frontier areas of technology and global military bases. Bipolar, because China have moved closer to the US in terms of economic and military capabilities and other emerging powers like Russia, Indian, Brazil etc. are far behind these two powers-the US and China. Multipolar elements in the present transitional global order are imparted by some emerging powers like India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, South Korea among others. In final analysis, the core of nascent bipolarity is overlaid by a strong layer of multipolarity. In this transitional global order, India’s strategic autonomy, in practice transforms to multi-alignment within the constraints of major powers like the US, China and Russia still under play due to a number of factors like India’ strategic engagement/ dependence or overwhelming impact of these power on global economy and security as far as India is concerned. In spite of all these constraints, India still follows the policy of non-alignment as far as alignment with any military bloc is concerned, which was the case during cold war era. Since the international landscape during cold war, in practice, was largely defined by military bloc politics, India’s policy was named as non-alignment. Since in the present context the land scape is characterized by the emerging sign of multipolarity, in practice, strategic autonomy leads to multi-alignment. Thus, the differences in practical appearance between non-alignment and strategic autonomy are due to the change in international landscape during cold war and post-cold war periods. The substance of both approaches is the same- independence of foreign policy, when India’s core national interests are involved. However, at present, two additional justifications are cited by scholars for adhering to the principle of strategic autonomy: India is an emerging power now; and India is civilizational country and thus have right to chart out its independent course.
India’s Strategic Autonomy: Contemporary Constraints
India’s strategic autonomy is tuned to realize India’s national interests by following an independent following policy in issues of strategic importance. However, it is faced with some constraints in exercise of her independent policy. The sources of these constraints are largely related to India’s relations with the US, Russia and China, which are three major players in global arena, specially in context to India’s foreign policy implementation. India would like develop the level of relationship with these powers to the level and intensity which suits to India’s national interests or foreign policy goals. This is what we mean by India’s balancing game with these powers. According to Shashi Tharoor (2025), it is a balancing act — sometimes precarious, often imperfect, but essential for a country such as India that aspires to global leadership without becoming a client state.
However, India’s balancing diplomacy does not always move smoothly. It moves smoothly when there is less polarization and confrontation between these powers. However, at present, the level of polarization between the US and the west on the one hand and Russia and China on the other have intensified due to many tension areas such as Ukraine war, issue of Taiwan, Gaza conflict, US-Iran confrontation. On these issues, the concerned powers have adopted an attitude or posture which defies reconciliation in near term due to their own interests. Thus, the present round of polarization among major powers is the immediate and potential source of constraints on India’s strategic autonomy. These constraints are being played on India’s ties with these nations.
India, US and Russia
A major area of constraint emerges from the policies of the US particularly under the second Trump administration, known for transactional diplomacy, pressure tactics and short terms gains. The Trump administration is moving on with the premise that if some country is not toeing her foreign policy line, she is not with us. and the US will align with your enemy to pressurize you to follow US foreign policy line. Thus, Trump administration in August, 2025 has imposed 25 percent extra tariff on Indian goods imported to US in addition to 25 percent announced earlier to pressurize India not to purchase oil from Russia. The logic is that when India buys oil from Russia, the latter gets money which finances Russian war against Ukraine! The fact is that many other countries including China and European countries purchase oil and energy from Russia, but they are exempted from such punitive tariff. The US and European Union have imposed punitive economic and military sanctions against Russia in the wake of Ukraine conflict. Thus, the US has weaponized trade to extract political obedience from India in view of the fact that the US is the largest trading partner of India with $191 billion bilateral trade and enjoys some trade surplus of $40 billion. America’s this transactional diplomacy is worrisome in view of the close strategic ties cultivated between the two nations over the last two decades.
Not only that, the US is trying to develop close ties with Pakistan as both countries have signed commercial agreements for development of cryptocurrency in Pakistan and mining of rare earth minerals in Pakistan by the U.S. companies. President trump has invited Pakistan’s Army Chief and now Field Marshal Asim Munir over launch in White House and bestowed full parse on Pakistani leadership. Trump has not criticized Pakistan terror activities in Pahalgam and has adopted neutral stance on India’s operation Sindoor. In spite of India’s repeated denial, Trump is repeatedly claiming that he has mediated ceasefire between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan has endorsed Trump for the award of Noble peace prize in 2025, though, he was not awarded Noble peace prize at least in October, 2025. Yet Trump continue to project himself as deal maker and peace maker, irrespective of the fact whether others recognize it or not.
The proposed trade deal between India and US is out of site despite five rounds of negotiations till the first week of November, 2025. The conditions put forth by the US undermine India’s domestic policies also. There are two ticking points in this deal. First the US is insisting that India should open its market for US agri-products and dairy products as well as fisheries. But India says that in the interests of her farmers and fisherman, India cannot open unlimited imports of these items, because agriculture and fisheries are the means of livelihood for millions of people in India. Second, India follows the policy not permitted the production and import of genetically modified food items on health ground, but the US food products are genetically modified (Livemint:2025). If this pact is not signed, India-US stand off is likely to persist at least during the tenure of President Trump.
The Trump administration is also objecting India’s 2016 agreement with Iran for the development and use of Iran’s Chabahar port. India wants to develop this port as an anchor for her connectivity with central Asia and also for alignment with International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) passing though Iran and connecting Mumbai with Moscow as an alternative short route between India and Russia. On 22 June 2025, the US has launched military strike with bunker buster bombs on Iran’s three nuclear sites- Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan under operation Midnight Hammer in support of Israel’s conflict with Iran (BBC;2025). Thus, America’s historic tensions with Iran have further conflated. America has also imposed sanctions against Iran. Though, the US has given waiver for one year on Chabahar port, but American dictates on Iran constrain India’s policy in the region. India has already stopped buying oil from Iran due to US sanctions. American sanctions have negative impact on close ties between India and Iran.
India considers Russia as reliable strategic partner since the cold war days. Among other things, India and Russia have developed robust partnership in defence, space research and nuclear energy. In spite of India’s efforts for diversification of defence procurement, Russia still accounts 36 percent of India defence procurement during 2019-23 cycle as per SIPRI report. Russia has been the most important suppliers of defence equipment to India, as around 70 percent of India’s current military arsenal is of Russian origin (Dwivedi: 2022; Economics Times: 2025). India is also dependent for the supply of spare parts for this defence arsenal. In view of these facts, India is pursuing strategic partnership with Russia with provision for annual summit since 2000, which was elevated to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ in 2010. India purchased Oil from Russia in 2023 and 2024 on concessional rate as which reached to 36 percent of India’s total oil imports in 2024. It was justified in view of the fact that India is dependent on imports for f85 percent of her oil requirement and Russian oil was cheap in comparison to other sources. Now in view of America’s punitive tariff for this purchase in place, there are reports that India’s oil import from Russia is being slashed (The Tribune: 2025). India’s this action will not only undermine India’s close ties with Russia, but also be a notable constraint on India’s strategic autonomy. In coming months, the US may place similar conditions on the purchase of defence items from Russia.
Russia has never officially pressurized India not to develop close ties with the US or any other country, and India has been free to cultivate close strategic ties with the US in last two decades. However, due to her strategic partnership with Russia, India has refrained from criticizing Russia for her military action against Ukraine. The US and European nations have been persuading India since 2023 to declare Russia as aggressor as they have done. But India did not follow their dictate and abstained from all UN resolution which were critical of Russia military action. This has also been a sore point between India and the US. India has maintained a political settlement of Ukraine conflict through direct negotiations between the two countries. Once India tries in 2024, but could not succeed due to irreconcilable differences between Russia and Ukraine.
China and India
India and China have evolved a tense but managed relationship after the 1962 war. This process was disrupted following the Galwan military stand off between the two nations in 2020. They are trying again since 2024 to put in place a mechanism of management of tensions. However, China has started weaponizing supply chain against India and other countries in 2025. China is the second largest trading partner of India with $90 billion trade deficit annually. India is dependent on China for the supply of electronics items like magnets and intermediaries for pharmaceutical manufacturing. China holds monopoly in magnet production and rare earth procession. It is reported that China controls 62 percent of rare earth supply and 92 percent of global processing of rare earth material. Rare earth minerals are crucial for the mobile, electronics and defence industry (Time of India: 2025). In April, 2025, China placed complete ban on the supply of magnets to India. Magnets are critical elements for the electronic vehicle industry. Later, it placed blanket ban on the supply of rare earth minerals and their products to other countries (Mukul: 2025). Now in October, 2025, it has relaxed these restrictions for India after India’s request and opening of Chinese trade to India which was restricted since 2020. However, it has displayed chink in the armour of India’s global supply chain, which has significant implications for India’s strategic autonomy.
India’s Strategic Autonomy: The Way Ahead
Above discussion displays that India’s balancing game under the strategic autonomy does not have smooth pathways. India’s response to the US tariff onslaught has been two-fold. First, India did not react much publicly against US tariffs, except Ministry of Foreign Affairs terming US tariff as unjustified and unreasonable and continued to negotiate with the US for finalization of proposed trade deal. Second India’ signaled that it has other options by close hobnobbing with China’s President Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin during the SCO summit in Tianjin, China on 31 August-01 September, 2025. Indian PM Modi held bilateral meating with both Xi and Putin during this summit. During the bilateral meeting with Xi, Modi committed to ‘taking forward ties …based on mutual trust, respect and sensitivity’, and Xi called for the ‘Dragon (China) and the Elephant (India) to come together’. Some observers have termed this as unmistakable shift in India’s foreign policy (The Hindu: 2025). Though, Trump’s punitive actions against India have opened new pathways, but it cannot be termed a shift in India’s foreign policy because the coming of dragon and elephant together is fraught with many issues in view of China’s past record and also ongoing building of military infrastructure on near border. Thus, India- China bonhomie is a symbolic gesture rather than a long-term policy option for India. As far as Russia is concerned, India may downgrade its oil supply from Russia for now but she is unlikely to downgrade her strategic ties with Russia under the US pressure. Also, another point to ponder is whether Trump policy shift is long term US policy shift or a mere reflection of the transactional policy during the tenure of Trump administration, because many leaders and scholars in the US have been critical of the US actions against India. Also, the there is strong convergence of long-term strategic interests between India and the US, irrespective of Trump’s shenanigans.
In view of these facts, some viable policy options to protect her national interests under the framework of strategic autonomy.
First, India needs to diversify her economic, trade and defence engagement by identifying and developing alternative markets and alternative supply chains of defence items, rare earth minerals and energy. This needs to be adopted as along term but continuous goal. After all, India’s vulnerability has arisen due to her over dependence on the US for trade market and on China for supply chains.
Second, India needs to enhance her capabilities in economic, defence, and emerging technologies through various programmes like Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make in India and other similar initiatives. In the final analysis, Strategic autonomy cannot be protected by diplomacy alone, it is a function of national capabilities also. Thus, India needs to continue to adhere to strategic autonomy and further strengthen her capabilities to address the constraints on this policy. The constraints imposed by the US and China should be taken as a new opportunity for India to further strengthen the entire landscape of strategic autonomy in he favour.
REFERENCES
BBC (2025) What we know about US strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites. BBC, 23 June, 2025. Available At: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o
Dwivedi, Major General (Dr), Retd GG (2022) Why India cannot afford to delink from Russia for its defence need? India Today, 28 February, 2022. Available At: https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/russia-ukraine-war-india-cannot-afford-to-delink-from-moscow-1918878-2022-02-28.
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