The strategic fluidity is the best word to describe the defining element of prevailing global order. The global order has experienced many shifts since the evolution of state system by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, but it has never been so fluid and even directionless as it is now. The decline of US hegemony in Middle East (Iran -US war), the fractures in NATO Alliance, Trump’s uncertain and often unpredictable strategic moves, inability of the UN system to manage the ongoing conflicts- Ukraine war, Gaza crisis, Iran war, and many civil wars in Africa, and the emergence of many new major powers like Brazil, India, China, South Africa etc are Some factors which underline the fluidity of the prevailing global order.
How to understand and explain the prevailing fluidity of global order?
The global order consists of certain foundational norms and structures. While foundational norms guide the behavior of national actors, the structure is the pattern of behavior of major actors of global order. Broadly, there are two approaches to explain the nature of global order:
First, the Norm-based Approach, and Second the Structure-based Approach. The norm-based approach identifies the foundational norms of the prevailing global order and seeks to explain the change in the global order on the basis of changes in the foundational norms of the order. Thus, only changes in the foundational rules, not the actors leading those rules will be construed as change in the global order. Scholars like John Ikenberry (2001, 2018) L. Martin (1992) and J.G. Ruggie (1993) have followed this approach. John Ikenberry defines an international political order as ‘the governing arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles and institutions.’
These western scholars have identified following three foundational principles of global order (Sangiovanni and Hofmann: 2019):
1. The global order is inter-national and state–led, based on principles of sovereign equality and national self-determination.
2. The order is liberal insofar as it promotes economic openness and interdependence between most countries worldwide.
3. To sustain these substantive principles, governments have endorsed a procedural principle of multilateralism, which includes two aspects: ruled based justification of behavior and inclusivity. Later, principles of democracy and respect to human rights were also added to this list to complete the liberal notion of global order.
For these scholars, as long as these foundational principles are nor replaced, the global order will not change. The prevailing order may face changes if these principles are challenged, but alternative order will emerge only if alternative foundational principles are put in place. Regarding China’s aggressive behavior with respect to defying international rules in South China Sea and its undermining the principles of democracy and human rights, the European Union has remarked that China is the ‘systemic’ challenge to the prevailing global order. But the order survives as China has not been able to replace the foundational principles of the prevailing order.
The Second approach to explain the global order is structure-based analysis, which tries to identify the pattern of behavior of nations within the prevailing system. This approach is more visible in academic discourse on changing nature of the global system. Morton Kaplan in his path-breaking work, System and Process in International Politics (1957), described somehow correctly the bipolar system prevailing during the cold war, but proved incorrect about the future changes and shifts in the bipolar system. Kenneth Boulding (1958) rightly remarked about Kaplan’s work, “This is an important book for the trails it breaks rather than the goal at which it arrives”. However, the element of polarity remained the starting point for scholars in discussion on the nature of post-cold war global order, without realization that the bipolar framework has changed that bipolar framework has changed beyond recognition. Immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US remained the only superpower and the global order was said to be characterized by America’s ‘Unipolar Moment’ and end of ideology thesis of Francis Fukuyama. However, after a decade or so the rise of China and later the resurgence of Russia shattered the dream of ‘Unipolar moment’. The Clash of Civilization thesis of Huntington in 1996 further eroded the durability of American hegemony (The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order, 1996). The BRIC thesis of Jim O’Neil predicted that the four economies- Brazil, Russia, China and India would surpass the economies of Europe and north America by the year 2050 (Goldman Sachs:2001). Thus, BRIC (Now BRICS with joining of South Africa in 2011) when formed in 2009, demanded a global order which is just, equitable and fair and characterized by multilateralism. These ideas made the scholars to predict that the world is headed towards multipolarity. But the world is not multipolar as the US still continues to be the dominant global power. There are multiple sources of dissonance against American dissonance, but all of them are not ‘poles’in the global order. The idea of ‘polarity’ which dominated international discourse to describe the global order is no more valid in the 21st century.
In fact, the scholars of international politics under this approach are confronted with the parable of elephant and five blind men as there are multiple interpretations of the prevailing global order. Thus, we need to make paradigmatic shift from the element of polarity to better understand the nature of present fluid global order. It is true that there are big, small and middle powers in the international platform, but all of them are concerned with forming poles rather they are concerned with realizing their core economic and strategic interests, irrespective of the fact which pole they belong. This makes the present global order fluid and transactional, further hampering the development of poles. Pointing to the fluidity of post-Cold War geopolitics, P S Raghavan, the Chairman, National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) said recently there was no longer a congruence, but only a convergence of interests with other countries (DH: 2024).
This paper follows the structure-based analysis of global order. It begins with the minimum threshold of ‘Strategic Affiliation’ as the basic feature of the present global order. The global order presents as a network of strategic affiliations among major actors of international politics. Here strategic is taken not something related to defence and security or something having long term implications, but as something which nations consider as important in the national interest as articulated by them. ‘Affiliation’ is a close engagement of transactional nature which is beneficial to two or more actors. It is distinct from ‘strategic coalition’ and ‘strategic polarity’ in the sense that affiliation has fluid boundaries giving possibilities of multiple engagements even sometimes apparently contradictory to each other. Thus, strategic affiliation lacks the cohesiveness and some durability displayed by strategic coalition and strategic polarity. The elements of multilateralism, multialignment and strategic autonomy are nothing but the tool to reinforce the network of strategic affiliations. However, if strategic affiliations coincide with the long-term strategic goals of players and is directed against a counter strategic affiliation, they may generate strategic polarity, which may co-exist with large network of strategic affiliations.
Global Order: Strategic Polarization and Depolarization
Some major networks of affiliations are discussed below:
US and Europe Vs China and Russia
For last two decade or so, there has been conjecture that the US power is on decline and China will soon take over US as the largest global power in the world. This inference was drawn from the rise of China as major economic, military and technological power in the post-cold war period. The perceptible decline of US and rise of China was encapsulated in the ‘Rise of Asia’ thesis supported by many scholars like Kishore Mahbubani (The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, 2008); Parag Khanna (The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New World, 2008) Emmott Bill (Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, Japan and India will Shape Our Next Decade, 2009) and Tay Simon (Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post-Crisis Divide from America, 2010). Meanwhile, China’s economic rise and military modernization coupled with assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region corroborated this thesis. China became the second largest economy in the world replacing Japan to the third place in 2010. China with GDP of $18.5 trillion (2023) is closely following the American GDP of $ 28 trillion. China has emerged as the global hub of manufacturing and made considerable progress in frontier areas of technology like AI, G5 and G6, semiconductors, solar energy, space and missile technology, aircraft carrier, fifth generation of fighter jets among others. China has also launched its flagship programme BRI (Belt and road Initiative) to connect Asia with Europe through connectivity infrastructure. The BRI is viewed as China’s strategy to increase her strategic influence from Asia to Europe.
The US strategy to counter China’s rise revolves around collective hedging and also confrontation if need arises. It has roots in ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, 2011 of Obama, which focuses on mobilizing American military and diplomatic resources to the Indo-Pacific region to counter rising China. The US National Security Strategy of 2017 and of 2022 (White House: 2022) both viewed China and Russia as the main threat to America’s global interest and influence. Besides bolstering her military presence in the Indo-Pacific as a ‘resident power’, America has mobilized her allies and partners in strategic alliances against China. Along with India, Japan, and Australian, US formed the Quad in 2017 and AUKUS in 2021 with Australia and UK. China views these groups as cold war mentality of US, designed to curtail China’s rise. The Ukraine war since 2022 has led to further tensions between the US and her European Allies on the one hand and Russia and China on the other hand. While the US has mobilized NATO and European Allies to confront Russia in Europe, she has bolstered her military presence and mobilized the support of her regional allies like Australia, South Korea and Japan in Indo-Pacific to counter China in the South China Sea, Taiwan and other issues in the Indo-Pacific.
This scenario presents as if strategic polarization is emerging between the two camps: US, European Union, Japan, South Korea Australia and Canada in the one camp and China and Russia and some other countries like North Korea and Iran in another camp. But it would be over simplifications if we view the internal dynamics of these camps.
Strategic Polarization Undermined: Way towards Strategic Affiliations
There are many instances of dissention within the strategic camps as well as the role of new actors beyond these strategic coalitions which underlines the dilution of strategic polarization and gradual emergence of strategic affiliation among major national actors.
Even the European allies of the US may be united against Russian aggression, but European Union has displayed the sense of ‘Strategic Autonomy’ as far as China’s goods markets and investment opportunities are concerned. In 2022, The EUs European Foreign Affairs Review dedicated a full issue to explore the significance of strategic autonomy for its foreign relations. The EU is trying to find multilateral solutions, while being able to take lawful action alone to safeguard the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity (Hoffmeister: 2023). EU’s Strategic autonomy has direct consequences for its relations with US on the one hand and China and others on the other. The European Commission defines strategic autonomy as ‘‘the EU’s ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement, reflecting its strategic interests and values.’ A Report of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC: 2023) suggests that the current trade tensions between the US and China could increase further geopolitical rivalry and in turn into a bipolar configuration is not suitable to European interests It says that moving away from the multilateral trade system based on rules would expose the EU to greater risks. In such perspective, the EU should re-engage in the reform of the multilateral system as a way to mitigate its foreign vulnerabilities. The Report acknowledges that together with the US, China plays a key role in defining the world’s geopolitical space. It must be acknowledged that China holds a central position in global trade and supply chains and any attempt to decouple from China presents challenges for EU policymakers and businesses. Thus, in certain sectors, decoupling remains unfeasible due to specific input product supplies and raw material control. The NATO and EU may appear united behind the US to confront Russia in Ukraine war but the individual concerns of the countries like France, Germany and Hungry cannot be ruled out. The key difference in US super power position during the cold war and in 21st century is that while during cold war it’s allied were dependent on US, but now the US is dependent on its allies for implementing its global agenda.
The Ukraine war has brought Russia and China in strategic embrace, but that cannot said to be a permanent alliance in international politics. Immediately after the cold war, Russia was co-opted by the western world and China was promoted to become a manufacturing hub. China is still the largest trading partner of the US. But now the clash of interest has placed them against US. Even the bonhomie between Russia and China is not without tensions caused by their competing interests in Central Asia, China’s occasional territorial claims in the far east of Russia and acrimonious historical background of ties. In 2017, when Russia pushed India for the membership of SCO, China to prompt to push Pakistan as a counter-balance against India. China is well aware of strategic partnership between India and Russia.
India: A new balance in Global System
India has emerged as a powerful balancer in the international politics in 21st century. Under its ‘strategic autonomy’ doctrine India is maintaining balanced ties with US on the one hand and Russia on the other. PM Modi has reached Russia on 8 July, 2024 for annual summit with Putin. When Russia and India finalized the deal for purchase of missile defence system S-400 from Russia in 2018, India went ahead with this deal, in spite of lurking US sanctions. During Ukraine war, India abstained from all UN resolution proposed by the US and European countries to declare Russia as an aggressor. During the Ukraine war, when Russia was subjected to many economic and military sanctions by the EU and the US, India went on to purchase cheap oil from Russia in defiance of those sanctions. India also avoided this pitfall during the drafting of G-20 declaration in September, 2023. Similarly, The US imposed sanctions against Iran at different occasions, but India went ahead to sign the Chabahar agreement with Iran in 2016. In 2024, India has got the right of operation of a terminal in the Chabahar port. Besides, the principle of strategic autonomy, Indian foreign policy has also become more pragmatic in pursuance her core national interests. Now India is no more concerned with internal democratic process of Myanmar, but would seek the engagement with military regime to protect her own interest. India’s balancing approach in Gaza war is another example of India’s pragmatism as it would not like to disturb her ties with Israel. In the Middle East, India has pursued interest-based diplomacy by cultivation relations with all stakeholders like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran or UAE. Turkey and its fried Azerbaijan are sympathetic to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, and in response India is cultivating close ties with their rivals Greece and Armenia. In nutshell, India is following the policy of ‘multialignment’ rather than non-alignment to protect her interests in the fluid international politics. India’s call for strengthening multilateralism is nothing but a factor in depolarization of global politics. One may argue that India independent foreign policy did not cut much ice during the cold war; hence it may not be consequential to global power politics now. But this is not true. In view of development of military and economic capabilities, India of 21st century is not the India of 1960s.
There are other actors in the contemporary global politics which have adopted an autonomous path in foreign policy to realize their interests. Saudi Arabia, the regional power in the Middle East has been considered as the permanent strategic ally of the US since the WWII. However, it followed foreign policy, independent from the US on many occasions. Saudi Arabia did not sign the Abraham Accords backed by the US in 2020-21 to normalize diplomatic ties with Israel. Again, Saudi Arabia and Iran signed an agreement for mutual understanding in 2023, which was mediated by China! During Ukraine war Saudi Arabia did not comply with the US demand that the output of oil should be increased, but it coordinated its oil production policy with Russia under the OPEC Plus mechanism. Saudi Arabia maintains close ties trade and investment ties with China also. The regional powers like South Africa and Brazil have followed independent policy in the wake of Ukraine war.
Conclusion
The above analysis attests the conclusion that the present global order is not defined by ‘polarity’ of any kind. Rather it is defined by the network of strategic affiliation of transactional nature under which each nation pursues its own course to protect its core interests. If the interests of nations coincide on certain point they develop the strategic understanding and conduct their relations in transactional manner. Though the US continues to be the only global power, its hegemony to enforce its will on global conditions has diluted in comparison to earlier times. But, it is equally unlikely that China will replace US as a global power in near future. The reason is that in spite of China’s growing military and economic strength, its strategy is extractive rather than willingness to bear the global responsibilities. Thus, lacks the normative acceptability to emerge as a global power. Moreover, there are other significant global powers like India, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey which pursue a policy of multilateralism and depolarization. This scenario cannot be described as multiple polarity or even multiple strategic coalitions. The Cold war hold of ideology on international politics has been replaced by the interests of the nations. This is at best a network of strategic affiliations which revolve around the core strategic interests of national actors.
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